Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 7

March 1996

The Jury's Role in Patent Cases: Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.
Paul N. Higbee Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul N. Higbee Jr., The Jury's Role in Patent Cases: Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 3 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 407 (1996).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss2/7

This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Higbee: The Jury's Role in Patent Cases: Markman v. Westview Instruments,

THE JURY'S ROLE IN PATENT CASES:
MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTR UMENTS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation often involves technological data that confuse
even the most experienced judges.1 In addition, patent claims
possess both contractual and statutory qualities and thus present
a special challenge to adjudication. This challenge primarily stems
from uncertainty over how to interpret claim language, who should
interpret claim language, and what role, if any, extrinsic evidence
should play in claim interpretation.2
As a result of such complexities, some commentators believe that
the typical jury lacks the ability to provide adequate services in the
course of a patent trial.'
The constitutional right to trial by jury, however, cautions
against attempts to remove the jury completely from patent
litigation.4 The Supreme Court, attempting to walk the tightrope
between these two considerations, recently held in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.5 that patent claim construction (or
interpretation) is a matter of law, completely out of the jury's hands
and thus subject to de novo review on appeal.' After reviewing the
factual, procedural, and legal history of Markman, as well as the
analyses of both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, this
Recent Development scrutinizes the reasoning behind and ramifications of those opinions and concludes that a specialized rule of
patent claim construction allocating a limited, clearly defined task
to the jury in the event of genuinely ambiguous claim language

'See Victoria Slind-Flor, JuristsLearn to Cope with the Brave New World, NAT'L L. J.,
Oct. 19, 1992 (claiming judges often fail to understand complex technological issues).
2 See infra notes 41-42, 115-118, 130 and accompanying text and note 48.
' See Symposium, Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 77
(1994) (publishing transcripts from conference discussion of jury in patent cases). See
generally Roger W. Kirst, The Jury's HistoricDomain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH. L. REV.
1 (1982) (exploring possible benefits of complexity exception to right to jury trial).
' The Seventh Amendment provides "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
' 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).

Id.
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would better serve patent litigation. Such a rule would adhere to

the policies underlying the current patent statute and further the
objectives of patent law.

II. BACKGROUND
The events leading to the Markman litigation began with Herbert
Markman's invention of an inventory control system for dry
cleaning businesses. The typical dry cleaning business stands
particularly susceptible to petty theft by employees.7 Customers'
articles of clothing are usually mixed up during the cleaning
process, rendering nearly impossible a determination of who may
have taken any single article during the sorting process that takes
place after cleaning.'
Markman invented and patented an inventory system for dry
cleaners that keeps a record of articles of clothing brought in and
monitors their progress through multiple phases in the dry cleaning
process.9 The system keeps a record of the customer, the type of

7

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). Because of its more detailed recitation of
the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit's opinion is cited for the case background.
Additionally, this Recent Development will devote nearly equal attention to the Federal
Circuit's opinion as to Supreme Court's opinion because attorneys will most likely deal
exclusively with the Federal Circuit in the future as to the issue of claim construction.
8
1d.
' Id. at 971-72. Patent specifications contain the description of the invention; patent
claims are the part of the specification that are meant to identify the subject of the patent
grant. The claim at issue describes Markman's invention to be an inventory control and
reporting system, comprising:
a data input device for manual operation by an attendant, the input
device having switch means operable to encode information relating to
sequential transactions, each of the transactions having articles
associated therewith, said information including transaction identity and
descriptions of each of said articles associated with the transactions;
a data processor including memory operable to record said information
and means to maintain an inventory total, said data processor having
means to associate sequential transactions with unique sequential indicia
and to generateat least one report of said total and said transactions, the
unique sequential indicia and the descriptions of articles in the sequential transactions being reconcilable against one another;
a dot matrix printer operable under control of the data processor to
generate a written record of the indicia associated with sequential
transactions, the written record including optically-detectable bar codes
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articles to be cleaned, and how the articles will be cleaned. 10 The
business owner may record still more information if desired, and
the system can generate reports of all entered information. 1
Using this system, a business owner can keep track of every article
of clothing during each step of the dry cleaning process and thus
detect any removal at the specific point in the process where it
occurred. 2 Such information greatly facilitates the discovery of
the party or parties responsible for stealing from the business as
well as serving as a deterrent to potential thieves.
Westview, the defendant, manufactured a device consisting of two
pieces of equipment, the Datamark and the Datascan. 13 The
Datamark prints a bar-coded ticket listing information about the
customer, clothes to be cleaned, and charges, but keeps in memory
only the invoice number, date, and cash total. 4 The Datascan is
a portable device that reads the bar codes in order to identify any
discrepancies. '5 Unlike Markman's system, the Westview system
is incapable of tracking articles of clothing, pinpointing additional
or missing articles, and 6generating reports about the location and
status of those articles.1
Despite the variations between the two systems, Markman filed
suit against Westview for infringement. After a jury verdict for
Markman, the district court granted Westview's motion for
judgment as a matter of law, holding " 'inventory' as used in the
claims meant 'articles of clothing' and not simply transaction totals

having a series of contrasting spaced bands, the bar codes being printed
only in coincidence with each said transaction and at least part of the
written record bearing a portion to be attached to said articles; and,
at least one optical scanner connected to the data processor and
operable to detect said bar codes on all articles passing a predetermined
station,
whereby said system can detect and localize spurious additions to
inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom.
Id. at 972.
10Id.
" Markman, 52 F.3d at 972.
1 Id.
'S Id.

at 971.
at 972.

14Id.

'5Id. at 973.
'6Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
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or dollars." 7 Thus, the district court concluded that since
Westview's device did not retain information about specific
garments, it therefore did not infringe upon Markman's patent. 18
The Federal Circuit affirmed, 9 and the Supreme Court affirmed
unanimously.20
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS ANALYSIS IN MARKMAN

In Markman, the Federal Circuit held patent claim construction
(the process of determining precisely what qualities of an invention
a patent protects from infringement) a matter of law and attempted
to settle inconsistent circuit opinions on the issue. 2' The court
also defended this holding against Seventh Amendment attacks by
the dissent and one of the concurring opinions.22
On the issue of the jury's role in claim construction, Markman
argued that the jury was required to interpret certain contested
terms of his patent claim under Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.,' which
stated that when a disputed claim term arises and extrinsic

17

Id.

18Id.

"Markman, 52 F.3d at 970.
0 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
21 The court also held that the term "inventory," as used in Markman's patent claim,
necessarily included "articles of clothing." Markman, 52 F.3d at 982.
' Judge Mayer's concurring opinion argued that while the issue of patent scope is
ultimately a legal question, it does not follow that judges should decide every question that
comes up during claim construction. Id. at 989. Judge Mayer continued in this vein, saying
extrinsic evidence may occasionally cause a dispute over the meaning of a term in the claim.
Id. at 991. Judge Newman's dissent made a distinction between interpretation, which she
defined as the determination of the meaning of terms used, and construction, which she
defined as the legal effect of the properly understood terms. Id. at 1001. Despite the
semantics, the gist of Judge Newman's analysis seems nearly identical to that of Judge
Mayer; both think disputed terms should go to the jury, but that the court ultimately decides
the meaning of the patent claim as a whole. The majority also rejected the contention by the
dissent and one concurring opinion that patents are analogous to contracts and thus may
present triable issues of fact. Id. at 984-87. The majority noted that patents are not
contracts per se, and that extrinsic evidence is needed in patent cases only to inform the
court about claim language with which it is unfamiliar, because statutory requirements
forbid ambiguity. Markman, 52 F.3d at 985-86. The court found patent claims more
analogous to statutes than contracts and thus subject to interpretation by the courts only.
Id. at 987.
2762
F.2d 969, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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evidence is allowed, claim construction should be left to the jury.24
In addition, Markman contended that Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma
Produkt-UndMarketing Gesellschaft2 mandated deference by the
appellate court to the jury's interpretation of the claim.'
The
court in Tol-O-Matic reviewed a jury's claim construction only for
reasonableness.27
Markman then specifically asserted that the district court
wrongfully replaced the jury's implied construction of the claim
term "inventory" as meaning only "cash" or "inventory totals" with
its own construction of the term as necessarily including "articles
of clothing."' In support of his contention, Markman referred to
his own testimony as inventor as well as that of his patent
expert. 29 By contrast, Westview focused mainly on the patent
language itself and the prosecution history in advocating the
district court's holding.'
The majority reviewed the history of claim construction in the
Federal Circuit and found the cases relied upon by Markman to be
based on erroneous authority. The court began by stating that the
circuit originally held claim construction to be a matter for the
court.

31

A divergent line of cases stating the possibility of fact issues in
patent claim construction developed, however, in the wake of
McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co.,32 which stated that a jury may
interpret a claim if the meaning of a term is disputed and extrinsic

4

2

Id. at 974.

945 F.2d 1546, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
" Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973-74 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
27 945 F.2d at 1552.
' Markman, 52 F.3d at 974.
2
9 Id.
30 Id.
"' SSIH Equip. S.A v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 218 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 678 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The question of 'what is the thing patented' is one of law.*).
Judge Mayer's concurring opinion notes that many of the cases relied upon by the majority
were tried without a jury. Markman, 52 F.3d at 990. Indeed, SSIH Equipment was a bench
trial.
n 736 F.2d 666, 221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 944 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037
(1984).
25
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evidence is brought in to clarify the term's meaning.3
The
Markman majority pointed out that the main case relied on for this
proposition in McGill, Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc.' in fact
stated that claim construction is a matter of law. The court in
Envirotech expressly held that the "patented invention as indicated
by the language of the claims must first be defined (a question of
law)." '35 The majority also noted that the other two cases on which
McGill relied were contract cases.'
Both cases that Markman
used to buttress his assertion that claim construction may present
factual issues sprang from the line of cases following McGill.3 7
The majority in Markman next invoked support for its holding
from a line of Supreme Court decisions, including Hogg v. Emerson, 38 that the majority believed restricted patent claim construction to the bench. 3' The Court in Hogg stated that construction
of written words in a patent claim involves a question of law.'
The Markman majority argued that precedents such as Hogg
reinforced its own position that claim construction involves no
factual issues.
In addition to citing authority, the Federal Circuit proffered
several advantages to a rule limiting patent claim construction to
the court. First, the court noted that construction of written

" Id. at 672. Extrinsic evidence in patent cases includes prior art, documentary evidence,
and expert testimony, which may include testimony of the inventor, experts in his field, or
even patent attorneys. The specifications, claims, and prosecution history (official record of
what occurred during examination of the patent application; it is a public record), unlike
extrinsic evidence, are always available for consideration by the trial court.
34 730 F.2d 753, 221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 473 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
3 '

Id. at 758.
' Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en

banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
" Id. at 973-74. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
38 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437 (1848). The majority also cited without comment the following
Supreme Court decisions as supporting its position: Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 218
(1853); Winans v. New York & Erie R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88 (1858); Bischoff v. Wethered,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869); Heald v. Rice, 104 U.S. 737 (1881); Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565
(1895); Market St. Cable Ry. Co. v. Rowley, 155 U.S. 621 (1895); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer,
192 U.S. 265 (1904).
' The majority cited a list of seemingly ancient cases, but as the dissent even pointed
out, such old cases are apropos in the question of the right to a jury trial, since those courts
likely had a better idea of how that right stood in England and the United States in 1791.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 995-96.
40 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 484.
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evidence has been traditionally a matter for the court.4 ' Second,
the court discussed the special nature of the patent as a grant of
governmental rights which should be defined by the court.4 2
Additionally, the majority cited consistency of interpretation by
judges instead of juries as a beneficial result."
On the issue of the right to trial by jury, the Federal Circuit
defended its holding as constitutionally valid. The court asserted
that while claim construction rests exclusively in the province of
the court, the determination of infringement remains with the
jury." The majority then dismissed the two Supreme Court
decisions, Bischoff v. Wethered4 and Silsby v. Foote," relied on
by the dissent and one concurring opinion for their assertion that
factual issues may arise in patent claim construction.47 As for
Bischoff, the majority dismissed it quickly by pointing out that the
case involved not patent infringement, but breach of contract."
The court noted that the main issue in Silsby had been made
41 Markman,
42

52 F.3d at 978 (citing Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (Cranch) 180, 186 (1805)).
§ 154 (1994)).
4 Id. at 978-79. But see Howard T. Markey, On Simplifying PatentTrials, 116 F.R.D. 369
(1987) (claiming judges are no more likely to reach correct decisions than jurors); Jury
Comprehensionin Complex Cases, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. ON LITIG. (concluding after three year
study that in complex cases juries and judges reached similar conclusions); Slind-Flor, supra
note 1. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055
(1964) (summarizing initial results of massive Chicago Jury Project study of jury
performance); Kirst, supra note 3; R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence:
The View from the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85 (1991) (providing results from survey of Georgia
trial judges' opinions of juror performance).
" Markman, 52 F.3d at 984. As the dissent pointed out, however, the district court in
Markman failed to allow the jury to reconsider infringement in light of that court's
construction. Id. at 1008. Also, factual disputes over infringement "arise only over the
structure or operation of the accused method or device." William F. Lee & Wayne L. Stoner,
The Role of Expert Witnesses on Liability Issues in PatentLitigation in Light of Markman v.
1d. (citing 35 U.S.C.

Westview Instruments, in WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION, at 647 (PLI Pats.,

Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3952, 1995).
4 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869).
4 55 U.S. (14 How.) 218 (1852).
41

Markman, 52 F.3d at 988.

" Id. at 987-88. The majority also rejected Judge Rader's labeling of much of the
majority's discussion of patent claim construction as dictum. Id. at 988. The majority
additionally rejected the analogy of patents to contracts relied on by the dissent and Judge
Mayer's concurrence. According to the majority, patents bear a closer resemblance to
statutes, which are interpreted by the court alone. Id. at 984-87. The majority's reasoning
here seems odd given its own reliance on contract principles to support its holding. See infra
note 117 and accompanying text and supra note 22.
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obsolete by statute. In Silsby, while the Supreme Court generally
considered patent claim construction to be a matter of law,49 it
allowed the jury to intervene when a claim failed to designate
protected elements with particularity. 50 The Markman majority
dismissed this point by noting that while the current statute
requires that inventors particularly point out the elements
protected by their patents, the statute at the time of Silsby
required no such particularity. 5 ' The Federal Circuit went on,
however, to list both Silsby and Bischoff among the Supreme Court
cases supporting its holding in Markman.52
IV. THE SUPREME CouRTs ANALYSIS IN MARKMA

Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Souter affirmed
the Federal Circuit in a decision that evinced a high degree of
deference to the Federal Circuit's patent litigation expertise and
added little, if any, substantial analysis to that court's reasoning." Though the Court investigated the history of patent claims
and Supreme Court precedent in somewhat greater detail than did
the Federal Circuit, it found these resources of little help and based
its affirmation primarily on the notion that "judges, not juries, are
" 4
the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms. 5
While the Supreme Court in advocating judge superiority in
interpreting patent claims never expressly referred to the Federal
Circuit's opinion, the argument closely echoes one made by the
lower court.5"
The Court first considered the Seventh Amendment right to trial
by jury.' It found that because 18th-century infringement cases
were tried before juries, modern cases likewise require a jury

49 Sisby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 225.
50 Id. at 226.
51Markman, 52 F.3d at 988. Judge Mayer's concurrence and the dissent, however, noted
that the original patent act of 1790 required letters patent to describe the invention clearly.
Id. at 996, 1016. Thus the majority's contention seems largely a matter of semantics.
2
1d.
I at 977.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
Id. at 1395.
See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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trial, 57 and it then searched for an 18th-century issue analogous
to that of modern claim construction.' Construction of patent
specifications appeared to the Court as the closest analogous 18thcentury issue,5" and the Court found that the history of patent
specification construction illustrated "no established jury practice
sufficient to support an argument by analogy that today's construction of a claim should be a guaranteed jury issue. °
The Court then rejected two arguments by Markman which
asserted that the state of patent litigation in the 18th-century
nevertheless illustrates by implication the construction of patent
claims by juries. Markman first contended that juries must have
defined patent terms in order to reach the verdicts they did."l
The Court replied that there is no more reason to believe juries
interpreted patent terms than that judges did so, and that "we do
know that in other kinds of cases during this period judges, not
juries, ordinarily construed written documents."62
The Court also summarily rejected Markman's contention that
17th-century juries defined terms of art in patent specifications;
Markman cited no 18th-century authority to support his argument.63
Having apparently found that history supports no inference of a
Seventh Amendment right to have juries interpret patent claims,
the Court investigated precedent. It refuted Markman's reliance on
two cases, Bischoff v. Wethered'and Tucker v. Spalding," by
noting that in those cases the Court distinguished between
document interpretation and product identification and only
considered the latter capable of presenting fact issues.6

' 7 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389.
58 Id.

at 1390. The patent statute did not require use of patent claims until 1836. Id.
59 The Court noted that in 1791, the specification, like today's claim, "represented the key
to the patent." Id.
'0Id. at 1391. The Court noted, however, that this lack of an established practice likely
stemmed from the fact that juries had been introduced only recently to patent trials in 1791.
Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1391.
a'Id.
e2 Id. at 1392. The Court discussed land patents as one example. Id.
e' Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1392.
64 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869).
" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 453 (1872).
60 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1394.
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While the Court had appeared to consider history and precedent
as bases for affirming the lower court, at this point in the opinion
the Court seemed to lose some of the confidence with which it had
thus far rejected Markman's claims. Because "history and precedent provide no clear answers," the Court turned to "functional
considerations" in choosing between judge and jury. 7 Judges, the
Court concluded, are better qualified for the task because they
often construe written instruments.M
The Court rejected Markman's claim that juries should answer
questions of meaning peculiar to a field because testimony to
resolve such questions requires "credibility determinations, which
are the jury's forte."69 While conceding that "in theory there could
be a case in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to
choose between experts whose testimony was equally consistent
with a patent's internal logic," 70 the Court replied that such
situations almost never occur in reality. 71 This assertion rings of
the Federal Circuit's contention that patent claims should never be
ambiguous because of statutory requirements as to the procedure
that creates claims.7 2
The Court finally invoked the need for uniformity in patent
litigation as supporting its holding. Noting that the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals was created to encourage such uniformity, the
Court stated its belief that patent claim construction by judges
rather than juries would better facilitate that goal.73
V. LEGAL HISTORY OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A. THE PATENT ACT

An examination of the jury's role in patent litigation must begin
from the perspective of the Seventh Amendment's preservation of
the right to a jury trial as it existed in 1791, and also of the
67

Id. at 1395.

6 Id.
69 Id
70 1

71

Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
7"Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396. See supra note 43.
72See

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss2/7

10

Higbee: The Jury's Role in Patent Cases: Markman v. Westview Instruments,

1996] MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, INC.

417

Constitution's grant to Congress of the power to secure for limited
times to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries. 74 Since
the Patent Act of 1790, which allowed only "such damages as shall
be assessed by a jury," juries have played a role in patent suits at
law. 7' That the right to a jury trial in patent cases existed in
1791 by statute instead of common law is simply another factor
that renders the issue of the jury's proper role in such cases
singularly perplexing to courts wrestling with the problem.7
The current patent statute, enacted in 1952, requires that
specifications
contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, [and requires that the patent claim]
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.77
Unfortunately, the 1952 Act offers no guidance as to the jury's role
in patent litigation.
B. THE CASE LAW

The cases dealing with the issue of patent claim construction fall
into two historical groups: early Supreme Court decisions and
recent Federal Circuit cases. The issue appears in a number of

- U.S. CONST. art. I, § S, cl. 8.
of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (current version beginning at 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994)).
" The Federal Circuit majority in Markman noted that neither of the concurring
opinions, nor the dissent, nor any of the submitted briefs cites any cases on the issue of the
jury's role in 1791. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed. Cir.
75 Act

1995) (en banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). This fact further emphasizes the lack of clear

authority on the present issue.
7 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
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Supreme Court cases up until 1904, basically disappears, and then
resurfaces in the Federal Circuit in 1983. Both groups of cases
share an overall fragmented approach in defining the jury's role in
patent infringement claims. The case law on this topic as a whole,
nonetheless, suggests three basic rules: the issue of patent
infringement always goes to the jury; claim construction is
ultimately a matter of law; and genuine ambiguity as to specification terms goes to the jury. Courts universally accept the first rule,
and the second contention has nearly as wide acceptance." The
third rule marks the main point of division within both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.
In 1853, the Supreme Court in Hogg v. Emerson7 9 stated that
an unclear claim involves a legal question "so far as regards the
construction of the written words used."' Forty-two years later,
however, the Court intimated a different view when it called a
question of construction without any extrinsic evidence a "matter
of law for the court, without any auxiliary fact to be passed upon
by the jury."" This language suggests the possibility of factual
issues in patent claim construction. In 1904, the Court seemed to
reaffirm this notion by implication in Singer ManufacturingCo. v.
Cramer,2 which remarked that because several claims were
perfectly comprehensible on their faces, the infringement question
stood only for the Court's consideration.'
Since Singer, the
Supreme Court has not again addressed the issue of patent claim
construction.
The Federal Circuit has consistently exhibited a similarly
confused view as to the existence of factual issues in patent claim
construction. As the majority in Markman noted, the Federal
Circuit, like the Supreme Court, held at its inception that while the
question of infringement is factual, "the question of 'what is the
78For examples of the few cases that do not follow the second rule, see McGill Inc. v. John
Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 944 (Fed. Cir. 1984), (stating jury could
construe claims if extrinsic evidence is brought in to explain term's meaning); Palumbo v.
Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating similar
proposition).
7 47 U.S. (6 How.) 436 (1848).

soId. at 483.
" Market St. Cable Ry. Co. v. Rowley, 155 U.S. 621, 625 (1895).
82 192 U.S. 265 (1904).
83 Id. at 275.
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thing patented' is one of law .... ."" While some cases have
followed this rule, 5 the court in McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co.'
asserted that if "the meaning of a term of art in the claims is
disputed and extrinsic evidence is needed to explain the meaning,
construction of the claims could be left to a jury." 87 Several other
cases have adhered to the rule in McGill, including PeriniAmerica,
Inc. v. PaperConverting Machine Co." The court in Perini stated
that a dispute in the meaning of terms in the claim presents a
question of fact."9
To make matters even more troublesome, the courts purporting
to follow McGill have failed to adhere to a single rule.' At least
one decision in addition to McGill appears to have left the task of
patent construction entirely to the jury in the presence of a
disputed term.9
The court in Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc.,92 in a
cryptic pronouncement, stated that though claim construction is a
matter of law, "underlying fact disputes may arise pertaining to
extrinsic evidence that might preclude summary judgment treatment of claim construction. 9 3
Despite the mass confusion on this topic, two 1987 decisions
involving bench trials offer a third option in the McGill line of
holdings that synthesizes the three rules set down by the case law
as a whole. As mentioned above, the court in Perini, reviewing
under the clearly erroneous standard, found a dispute concerning
the meaning of terms in the patent claim to present a question of
84

SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365,376,218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 678 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
' See, e.g., Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 771, 218 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
781, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984) ("construction is a matter of law
for the court"); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569, 219 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("what is patented ... is a question of law").
86 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
s7 Id. at 672.
" 832 F.2d 581, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Other such cases include
Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Moeller v. lonetics, Inc., 794
F.2d 653, 657, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 992, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986); H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United
Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Cases supposedly holding claim construction completely a matter of law also exhibit
such subfragmentation. See infra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
91 Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
9794
F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
9Id.

at 657.
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fact." The Perinicourt, however, also suggested a limited role for
the fact-finder in this event; after the resolution of factual disputes,
the trial was to return to the task of claim construction, a matter
of law." Likewise, the Federal Circuit in H.H. Robertson, Co. v.
United Steel Deck, Inc." held claim construction to be a matter of
law and acknowledged factual issues only in the event of a dispute
over claim terms.97 Although neither case involved a jury, the
holdings of these two decisions provide formidable guidance in
dealing with the problems created by the majority's holding in
Markman."
VI. ANALYSIS

The peculiar circumstances of the Markman case provide a
unique context for analysis. Since the designation of the Federal
Circuit as the sole circuit court to hear patent appeals, the typical
route of an issue to the Supreme Court, via conflict among the
circuit courts, has been closed to patent issues. As a result, any
patent litigation that reaches the Supreme Court must pose an
issue of singular novelty.
The Markman holdings present an even more anomalous
situation. The Federal Circuit's majority opinion, itself more than
twice as long as Justice Souter's decision, combined with concurring
opinions by Judges Mayer and Rader as well as Judge Newman's
dissent, provides a fairly detailed analysis of the question presented. By contrast, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision disposed
of the issue fairly quickly by essentially reiterating the Federal
Circuit's concerns about uniformity and jury competence.
In response to this combination of the Federal Circuit's plenary
authority in patent litigation and the Supreme Court's apparent
inclination to defer to the Federal Circuit on the issue presented in
Markman, this Recent Development analyzes the two courts'
opinions as two parts of one basic holding, with greater emphasis
on the reasoning of the Federal Circuit.
"Perini, 832 F.2d at 584.
" Id.

" 820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
98 Id. at 389.
See infra note 128.
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A. SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKMAN, ITS LIMITATIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. is significant in that it
apparently eliminates the jury from the determination of just what
qualities of an invention a patent protects. Although the issue of
actual infringement remains with the jury, the holding clearly
delegates the responsibility of claim construction to the court."
Perhaps more significantly, the Federal Circuit in reviewing patent
cases no longer needs to defer to the district court's findings on the
meaning of claim terms, as they are now subject to de novo review.
As Judge Mayer's concurrence pointed out, the Federal Circuit
basically gave itself carte blanche on review,1 "° and the Supreme
Court apparently does not mind this result. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit's failure to remand the case precluded the type of jury
determination of infringement that the majority promised its
holding would preserve.,01
Despite this broad holding, Markman is possibly limited by the
fact that neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court
addressed the roles a court and jury would play should a genuine
ambiguity arise in the course of claim construction. The Supreme
Court expressly refused to decide the extent to which the Seventh
Amendment can be said to have crystallized a law/fact distinction,
or whether post-1791 precedent classifying an issue as one of fact
would trigger the protections of the Seventh Amendment if [unlike
this case] there were no more specific reason for decision." The
Federal Circuit similarly failed to address such a situation because
it believed that the statutory mandate that claim language be clear,
coupled with the supervision of the Patent Office, precludes the
possibility of any ambiguity in patent claim language. 3 As a
result, the holdings fall short of expressly forbidding a jury's
consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve any specific ambigu-

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996).
'0 2 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aft'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
-ld. at 984.
102 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1393 n.10. The Court went on to dismiss the possibility of
genuine factual issues in patent claim construction, such as questions of expert testimony
credibility,
as purely theoretical. Id. at 1395.
1
" Markman, 52 F.3d at 986 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112).
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ities, such as the definition of a particular word, in the event of
conflicting, equally plausible possibilities supported by substantial
evidence.
As shown from the above, the flaw in the Federal Circuit's
reasoning stems from its idealistic conviction that, because of
statutory requirements and administrative supervision, patent
claims could never be ambiguous.'0 4 If such a conviction has a
solid foundation in actual practice, then both courts correctly
restricted the fact-finder's role. Unfortunately, the reality is such
that language often fails in its intended purpose, and the Markman
holding offers no guidance for trial courts when a genuine ambiguity exists in a patent claim term. 5 Indeed, one district court
grappling with the Federal Circuit's holding lamented that court's
"wish to rely on a cold written record" and accused the court of
"sophistry.""~
An examination of the reasons offered by the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court in support of their holdings reveals the shortcomings of a rule restricting jury participation solely to a determination of infringement. One reason the courts cited is the in-

104 Id.

at 986. Specifically, the court contends if "the patent's claims are sufficiently

unambiguous for the PTO [Patent and Trademark Office], there should exist no factual
ambiguity." Id. at 986. One article has noted that liin essence, the Federal Circuit
judicially pronounced all patent claims as without ambiguity. This may come as a surprise
to many practitioners who sometimes are puzzled over the meaning of a claim term." Joseph
R. Re & Joseph F. Jennings, Answers and Questions Raised by the Federal Circuit's
Markman and Hilton Davis Decisions, in WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION, at 877
(PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3952,
1995). The Supreme Court's affirmation solidifies this result.
106Judge Newman's dissent criticized the majority for creating:
[A] procedural quandary, for extrinsic evidence can apparently be
received, but no jury can weigh it. When the extrinsic evidence is in
conflict--as it invariably is--what then? Will the Federal Circuit itself
weigh the evidence of expert witnesses? Will we receive a collection of
self-serving affidavits, without examination and cross-examination? Such
a procedure surely is not optimal for cases that may require decision of
complex ... processes.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 1006.
106Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unicon Indus., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1235 (D. Del. 1995).
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07
creased consistency of interpretation by judges in patent cases.
The first problem with this rationale lies in the fact that most
patent cases are already tried before judges, not juries.', Indeed,
the Federal Circuit relied mainly on bench trials in support of its
holding." As such, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court,
instead of questioning jury dependability, might better be understood to claim that the Federal Circuit alone may be depended upon
to interpret patent claims with accuracy and consistency (a
stunning proposition given the multiple opinions in the Federal
Circuit), since a trial judge's interpretation is now subject to de
novo review even when the judge believes a patent claim presents
factual questions.
The courts' refusals to provide district judges any guidance
concerning disputed terms supports the above conclusion."0
Whatever the motivation, such a situation benefits neither party in
a patent case, who now can plan on the extra expense of an appeal
any time a dispute arises as to a claim term."' Patent cases
might as well be allowed to circumvent the trial stage complete-

ly.l12

The reliance on judicial consistency suffers from another
weakness. While the opinions of many plaintiffs' attorneys may

" Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396; 52 F.3d at 978-79. Judge Mayer's concurring opinion
attacked the majority for attempting to create a "complexity exception" to the Seventh
Amendment. Markman, 52 F.3d at 993. On the idea of a "complexity exception," see Kirst,
supra note 3 (providing detailed account of modern movement for complexity exception to
right to trial by jury and historical underpinnings of movement).
'06Gary M. Ropski, Constitutionaland ProceduralAspects of the Use of Juries in Patent
Litigation, 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 609, 610-11 (1976).
" The following cases cited by that court were tried without a jury: SSIH Equip. S.A.
v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Kalman v. KimberlyClark Corp., 713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
110 Judge Newman's dissent lamented the imposition on trial judges of "uncertain
procedures." Markman, 52 F.3d at 999.
. Expenses will even mount at trial, as demonstrated by one district court that held a
two-day "Markman trial" after the Federal Circuit's holding in order to resolve disputed
claim language. ELF Autochem N. Am. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 850,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (D. Del. 1995).
11 Judge Newman's dissent wondered "how a record will be developed for the Federal
Circuit's de novo decision" under the majority's holding. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1005.
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weigh in for the proposition that judges are more reliable than
juries, no empirical evidence shows that "each of the more than 500
trial judges can be guaranteed to reach more 'correct' judgments
than those entered on jury verdicts.""3 In fact, "judges are often
at a loss to comprehend complex science and technology issues,"114 so the court's ostensible reliance on judges may well be
misplaced.
As an explanation for its own holding, the Federal Circuit
syllogized that because written evidence is a matter for the court
and patents are written evidence, interpretation of patent language
should be reserved for the court." 5 The court also opined that
the special nature of the patent as a governmental grant of rights
further requires that those rights be defined by the court."'
Ironically, though the court later rejected the analogization of
patents to contracts, it cited a treatise on contracts to support its
argument." 7 In refuting the analogization of patents to contracts, the court even went so far as to compare patents to statutes."18 In attempting to analogize patents to (or distinguish
them from) contracts and statutes, the majority, Judge Mayer's
concurrence, and Judge Newman's dissent all failed to consider the
option of treating patents as a third category of written evidence
with likenesses to, and differences from, both contracts and
statutes. Such a failure ignores both the general statutory nature
of patents as governmental grants of rights and their contractual
nature as individual documents protecting specific, bargained-for

113 Markey, supra note 43, at 372. Judge Mayer's concurring opinion stated "there is
simply no reason to believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve the
complex technical issues often present in patent cases." Markman, 52 F.3d at 993. The
dissent likewise doubted "that an appellate court's de novo finding of technologic facts is
more likely to attain accuracy, than the decision of a jury or judge before whom a full trial
was had.' Id. at 1005. See generally Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 57475 (1985) ("Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination...").
.. Stephen B. Judlowe & Lee A. Goldberg, Jury Trials, in PATENT LITIGATION 1994, at
173 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G43929, 1994).
11
Markman, 52 F.3d at 978. The Supreme Court made similar noises. Markman, 116
S. Ct. at 1395-96.
a6Markman, 52 F.3d at 978.

Id.
" 8 Id. at 987.
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rights of individual entities. These characteristics require the
clearly delineated collaboration of judge and jury.
Two Federal Circuit opinions and two Supreme Court decisions
relied on by the Federal Circuit subtly suggest that the jury should
play a role in the event of ambiguous patent claim language. The
Federal Circuit in Senmed v. Richard-Allan Medical Industries"9
spoke of "facts on which the claim interpretation must rest,"2 0
implying the possibility of jury questions in claim construction.
Similarly, the suggestion in Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics,
Inc.121 that "disagreement over the meaning of a term within a
claim does not necessarily create a genuine issue of material
fact"122 implies that such a factual issue could occur.
Surprisingly, some Supreme Court opinions relied on by the
Federal Circuit also intimate the existence of factual issues in
patent claim construction. The Court in Market Street Cable
Railway v. Rowley" noted that because a question involved no
evidentiary issues, it required no facts to be considered by the
jury.124 In Singer Manufacturing v. Cramer,1 " the Court likewise considered an issue of claim construction to be a matter of law
because the inventions described in the patents were comprehensible.'26 By distinguishing their own facts from a situation with
ambiguous claim language, the Court in both cases assumed the
possibility of factual disputes underlying patent claim construction.
B. PROPOSAL FOR BETTER INCORPORATION OF THE JURY INTO PATENT
LITIGATION

As many of the cases suggest, including some relied on by the
Federal Circuit, the jury should play a role in patent litigation
beyond mere determination of infringement. Judge Newman's
dissent noted that determination of the meaning of terms "is often

119888 F.2d 815, 12
20 Id. at 818 n.7.

1

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

952 F.2d 1384, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Ild. at 1387 (emphasis added).
124 155 U.S. 621 (1895).
Id. at 625.
'2 192 U.S. 265 (1904).
-sId. at 275.
121

22
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dispositive of the question of infringement."1 2 7 Thus the courts'
purported preservation of the jury in patent cases seems only a
pretense. A better method of dealing with the issue of the jury's
role in patent claim construction than that employed by the courts
is to keep the jury out of the process as long as the claim language
is clear, because in that case no dispute as to facts exists. Should
a linguistic ambiguity arise, however, the trial judge could instruct
the jury to decide that single narrow issue of fact."2 Such factual
findings would be reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard,
while the ultimate legal question of the meaning of the properly
interpreted claim would remain subject to de novo review. As
Judge Mayer's concurrence suggested, the trial judge could
additionally instruct the jury to give extrinsic evidence little weight
compared to the specifications, claims, and patent history. 1 2 9
Thus, this approach avoids the type of blurring or ignoring of the
distinction between factual and legal issues in patent claim
construction that currently permeates much of the case law.
This method offers several advantages over the Markman
holdings. First, it recognizes the special nature of patents as
something between contracts and statutes, both of which sometimes
require extrinsic evidence in resolving ambiguities. Though Judge
Mayer's concurrence offers the same basic notion, that notion is
premised on the faulty analogy of patents solely to contracts. 130
Second, the Federal Circuit was created to encourage uniformity
in patent law.13 ' The proposal presented here gives a clear rule
and will perpetuate the Federal Circuit's mandate to provide
uniformity not by granting the court power essentially to retry

"' Markman

v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),

aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). The dissent further noted that in Markman itself, the trial
judge's definition of "inventory" decided the question of infringement for all practical

purposes. Id.
" Judge Mayer's concurrence offered nearly the same resolution. Id. at 997. Although
Periniand Robertson involved bench trials, the Federal Circuit announced an analogous rule
in those cases. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. This rule differs from the
rules in either McGill or Palumbo, which did not clearly limit the jury's role in the event of
ambiguity. Instead, those cases left room to infer that the jury could interpret the entire
claim in the event of an ambiguous term. See supra notes 87, 91 and accompanying text.
'2 Markman, 52 F.3d at 991.
'30

Id. at 997.

1"Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396.
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every case, but by helping the district courts to properly allocate
factual and legal issues and thus to ensure that few cases require
appellate review solely over a disputed claim.1" 2 Such a result is
also economically efficient.
Finally, the proposed rule preserves the important role of the
jury as fact-finder.'3
After an instruction to take extrinsic
evidence lightly, the rule narrowly allows the jury to interpret the
meaning of disputed terms. By not allowing the jury to interpret
the remainder of the claim, the rule preserves the historical role of
the jury as fact-finder while recognizing the special dual nature of
patent claims.
The proposed rule would have worked well in Markman itself.
Had the district court in Markman adhered to this method of
analysis, the judge would not have instructed the jury to "determine the meaning of the claims.""3 The court would have retained the ultimate responsibility for that undertaking. Nor would
the district judge simply have charged that "[a]lso relevant are
other considerations that show how the terms of a claim would
normally be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art."1"
In contrast, under the proposed rule, the judge, while in the process
of construing the claim, would have allowed the jury to resolve the
dispute over the term "articles." The judge would have instructed
the jury to give any evidence other than the patent specifications,
claims, and prosecution history little weight. After a determination
by the jury on that term, the judge would have finished the process
of claim construction and then would have allowed the jury to
determine whether Westview's invention infringed upon the
'2 Conversely, the rule will not allow district courts to manipulate the standard of review
that might be applied on appeal. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:
A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 49 (1989) (expressing concern that
district courts can use current "indeterminacy of the fact/law distinction to insulate their
findings from review").
" One commentator has stated, "[wie didn't have jury trials back in the 50's or the 60's.

We have them now because that was the only way that a patentee could get a favorable
decision. I think we should not be too fast to change things .... " Symposium, Abolition of
Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 77, 84 (1994) (publishing transcript of
conference discussion of jury in patent cases) (commentary by Prof. Robert Shaw). See
generally Kirst, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing jury's value).
a"Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),

affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
1wId.
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properly interpreted claim.
As a result of these considerations, the jury's interpretation of
the disputed term "articles," instead of having to be inferred from
the verdict, would have been carefully elicited under proper
instructions that would have precluded the jury from giving
Markman's testimony (as well as that of three other witnesses) the
importance that the jury apparently gave it. Additionally, the duty
of determining infringement, which even the majority in Markman
agrees belongs to the fact-finder, would not have been usurped by
summary judgment before the jury had a chance to determine
infringement of properly interpreted claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
Patent claims, similar to contracts in some ways and to statutes
in others, hold a strange position in the realm of written instruments. The Markman decisions, in grappling with this peculiarity
of patent claims, alert patent attorneys to changes in the way
district courts will try patent cases. Unfortunately, instead of
clarifying the boundaries between judge and jury in patent cases,
the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court have refused to address the
problem of genuine ambiguity in patent claims. They have instead
characterized the facts of Markman as falling outside of such a
category and dismissed the possibility of such a genuine ambiguity
as extremely marginal.
In the event the Federal Circuit encounters a situation that it is
willing to characterize as presenting a genuine ambiguity in a
patent claim, a sui generis rule allocating duties to judge and jury
such as the one proposed here offers a viable means to achieve a
balance among the policies of providing jury trials as required by
the Seventh Amendment, ensuring a proper allocation of duties
between judge and jury, and encouraging uniformity in patent
litigation. Absent such a rule, however, attorneys who confront
real ambiguities in patent claims may find themselves facing de
novo scrutiny of what seems to them a factual question.
PAUL N. HIGBEE, JR.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss2/7

22

